


eduPKI Updates

Licia Florio
GN3 PR Network Meeting
Utrecht / NL, 09.02.2011

- eduPKI overview
- eduPKI as part of SA3
- What type of service are offered
- Main results

eduPKI and SA3 Service Portfolio



- eduPKI enables trust establishment in GN3 services:
 - Trust allows users to rely on a service;
 - Trust facilitates **confidence in the security and integrity of GN3 services.**

- eduPKI service objectives are to:
 - Support other of the project's services in defining their security requirements;
 - Provide them with digital certificates by **federating existing NRENs certificates services;**
 - *eduPKI defines how the certificates look like;*

Examples



The image shows two browser windows. The left window is at <https://www.tacar.org> and displays a security warning from the browser. The right window is at <https://intranet.geant.net/Pages/Default.aspx> and has its 'Page Info' dialog box open, showing certificate details.

Security Warning (Left Window):

- www.tacar.org**
The identity of this website has been verified by TERENA SSL CA.
- Certificate Information**
 - Your connection to www.tacar.org is encrypted with 256-bit encryption.
 - The connection uses TLS 1.0.
 - The connection is encrypted using AES_256_CBC, with SHA1 for message authentication and DHE_RSA as the key exchange mechanism.
 - The connection is not compressed.
- Site information**
 - You have never visited this site before today.
- [What do these mean?](#)

Page Info Dialog (Right Window):

General Details

This certificate has been verified for the following uses:

- SSL Server Certificate
- Email Signer Certificate
- Email Recipient Certificate

Issued To

Common Name (CN)	intranet.geant.net
Organisation (O)	Delivery of Advanced Network Technology to Europe Limited
Organisational Unit (OU)	Systems
Serial Number	01:00:00:00:00:01:24:ED:53:F1:1F

Issued By

Common Name (CN)	Cybertrust Educational CA
Organisation (O)	Cybertrust
Organisational Unit (OU)	Educational CA

Validity

Issued On	13-11-09
Expires On	13-11-12


Fingerprints

SHA1 Fingerprint	37:D6:CE:8F:32:FE:D2:D8:DA:7A:BF:85:68:11:CD:7A:6F:39:9A:F6
MD5 Fingerprint	55:3A:87:CE:2B:8C:BE:19:FD:42:9B:4F:AC:D3:11:61

Close

- By coordinating and harmonising trust across GN3 services, eduPKI:
 - Ensures efficiency as trust is dealt by a group of experts;
 - Facilitates implementation of a cohesive technical and policy infrastructure;
 - Avoids duplications of effort in different activities;
 - Will ease the transition from the current project to the next one;
 - Consequently improves the end-users experience;

- **Policy Management Authority (PMA)**
 - Interacts with GN3 services to assess their security requirements;
 - *And offers solutions to address them (trust profiles);*
 - Interacts with NRENs CAs to engage them;
- **A dedicated Certification Authority (eduPKI CA)**
 - For test purposes and to support those NREN users that cannot rely on any national CA service;
- **An enhanced version of the existing TACAR (TERENA Academic Certificate Authority Repository)**
 - To list the CAs participating in eduPKI
 - Used by the services' operators;




The coloured elements belong to eduPKI

- eduPKI targets GN3 (pilot) services:
 - Supporting them defining their trust requirements;
 - Facilitating access to digital certificates whenever needed;
- eduPKI targets NRENs:
 - NRENs are invited to participate by enabling their CAs to issue certificates in accordance with the eduPKI procedures.
 - This ensures continuity to users;
- eduPKI does not target end-users directly!


- eduPKI Business Case
 - Approved in May 2010;
- eduPKI governance and procedures in place;
 - Sept 2010;
- eduPKI cooperation with eduroam:
 - Very successful
- At the moment discussion initiated with SA2 and eduGAIN
- eduPKI Pilot phase:
 - Started in the summer 2010, ending in Feb 2011
- eduPKI service starts on 1 March 2011.

- eduroam collaboration with the eduroam resulted in:
 - eduroam trust profile
 - *Hence new certificates for the eduroam hierarchy;*
 - To date only eduPKI-CA issues these certificates:
 - *But discussion is started to engage TCS and DFN-PKI;*
- The process is completely transparent to end-users:
 - Only eduroam operators are involved;
- The usage of eduPKI certificates will:
 - Increase eduroam scalability;
 - Offer better security;
 - Change the trust model

- eduroam's current trust model follows a “**transitive approach**”:
 - Each node in the hierarchy trusts the ones it connects to;
 - Information travels through the whole hierarchy;



- The future eduroam trust model will follow a “**look-up approach**”:
 - Nodes will be able to use the information in the certificates to establish direct connections with each others;



- eduroam Trust Profile:
 - <https://www.edupki.org/fileadmin/Documents/eduPKI-Trust-Profile-for-eduroam-certificates-1.0.pdf>
- eduPKI governance documents:
 - <https://www.edupki.org/documents/pma-related-documents/>